Throughout the summer, rumors circled around Washington that Secretary
of State Colin Powell may resign over the policy differences between
him and other key advisers to President Bush. Although the Secretary
has publicly stated that he does not intend to quit, it is no secret
that he has serious misgivings with an American foreign policy that
takes its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and tells the
Europeans, including the Russians, to either follow America's lead or
become irrelevant.
Numerous critics of the President, however, are determined to resist
the implementation of his proposed course of action. That is the distinct
impression this writer gained at the 11th Annual Arab-American Policymakers
Conference and at two policy forums at the Cato Institute.
Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the most influential advocates
of Sharon's priorities, have neither sufficient experience with, nor
a genuine interest in, the hopes and aspirations of the Arab countries.
Neither did they give any indication so far that they want to lower
the tensions between the United States and the Arabs. They would rather
see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continue to smolder, while U.S.
armed forces invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld offered
the perfect rationale for placing the Palestinians on the backburner:
Since Israel has acquired the Palestinian lands in a war, he opined,
it can do with them what it wishes.
As in previous administrations, the National Security Adviser, sitting
next door to the Oval Office, has the President's ear day and night,
while the Secretary of State, presiding over the Department of State
at Foggy Bottoms, is all too often reduced to the role of implementer
of the policy moves hatched in the White House. Even when his arguments
are overruled, however, the General has been diligently executing his
President's orders, no matter how questionable their wisdom. Presently,
Mr. Powell has the difficult assignment of getting China, Russia, and
France to approve the President's policy initiative for a preemptive
attack on Iraq. He also had to meet with three Palestinian leaders,
(not including Yasir Arafat) and offer them tea and advice, but no hope.
Unless the President changes his adversarial stance toward all those
who disagree with the Sharon-inspired measures, Secretary Powell will
continue to find it difficult to modify the unilateral thrust of U.S.
foreign policy. He certainly agrees with the view that Saddam Hussein's
Iraq constitutes a terrorist threat. However, he first wants to give
the Palestinians the state that President Bush promised them in order
to gain broad-based Arab support.
Last week, the periodicals Commentary and Weekly Standard, as well as
Richard Perle's Defense Policy Board, denounced Saudi Arabia as America's
enemy. Yet, General Anthony Zinni, former chief of Central Command (operating
between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean), and its present combat
commander, General Tommy Franks, publicly commended Saudi Arabia and
the other Gulf states for their cooperation with the assignments of
the U.S. Forces in the region. Both stated that they consider the Arab
countries adjoining the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea vital for the successful
pursuit of the war on Al Qaida and any confrontation with Saddam Hussein's
Iraq. While not contradicting world-wide criticism of Saudi institutions
and policies, both generals rejected charges of Saudi subversion of
the war on terrorism as not only untrue but also damaging to the mission
of Central Command.
More than just a few present and former members of the foreign and military
service seem to be wondering what is the President's ultimate objective
in his Mideast policies. Nobody seems to know. One observer compared
the President to a dog chasing a car. He enjoys the pursuit; but it
never occurs to him what he would do with the car if he ever caught
up with it.