"I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization
and reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace
was much less developed than the planning for war." This is what
Richard Lugar, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, told Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. According to
the New York Times, "lawmakers have been stewing for weeks over
the administration's failure to consult in depth with Congress about
the costs, methods and goals of rebuilding Iraq, and some of those frustrations
boiled over at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.'
Wolfowitz admitted that lawlessness and looting had not yet been brought
under control, and electricity and water services are still insufficient,
but he did not admit that the Defense Department's vastly underestimated
the manpower and materiel needs for the occupation of Iraq. General
Eric Shinseki, the Army's chief of staff, was obviously not "wildly
off the mark," as his bosses claimed, when he predicted in February
that some 300,000 soldiers would be needed to ensure law and order in
occupied Iraq.
Partly due to the shortage of American troops and Iraqi police, both
Americans and Iraqis have been killed almost daily since the end of
the invasion. Wolfowitz was unable to tell Senator Biden how many more
billions of dollars it will cost to overcome the unexpected obstacles
to the normalization of life in Iraq. Senator Feingold spoke of "a
half-baked plan for reconstruction."
Meanwhile Secretary Rumsfeld, who never admits to be wrong, was busy
telling anybody who wanted to listen that the Pentagon had correctly
foreseen what happened in Iraq, and that the Iraqi people enjoy better
basic services now than before the war. Due to the slow progress in
the pacification and recovery of Iraq, both occupiers and occupied are
increasingly frustrated. Many Iraqis apparently thought Americans can
do better-and so do most Americans back home. Eroding confidence threatens
to breed cynicism.
The sharp criticism of the U.S. performance in postwar Iraq by members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reflects a growing distrust
in the pronouncements of the administration regarding its policies in
the Middle East. The world is still waiting to see Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction and proof of the alleged close ties between the secular
Hussein regime and the radically Islamist al-Qaeda conspiracy. What
would the administration have to lose if it invited the U.N. arms inspectors
back into Iraq to find the allegedly hidden arms or assure the world
that Iraq is free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons?
Even though law and order has not been sufficiently secured in either
Afghanistan or Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld is already busy demanding another
regime change, this time in Iran. It would take at least two more years
before Iran's nuclear energy facilities could produce a nuclear weapon,
and there is no proof that the Khatami government wants to do that.
Rumsfeld's charge that Iran hides members of al Qaeda is also unproven.
We know that Iran's Shiite regime thoroughly disliked the radical Sunni
regime of the Taliban. We also know that members of al Qaeda were arrested
in Iran. If Mr. Rumsfeld knows more, he ought to prove it. Even if his
charges were fully justified, threatening Iran with regime change serves
no useful purpose. Talking with the Iranian leaders about America's
concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and al-Qaeda fugitives
would be the civilized way of airing our grievances.
Secretary of State Colin Powell recently showed Mr. Rumsfeld how diplomats
deal with conflicts between countries. Powell personally went to Syria,
Russia, Germany, France, and Saudi Arabia to demonstrate America's willingness
to negotiate differences and improve bilateral relations. Regrettably,
the President did not authorize him to ask those countries to share
the heavy burden of America's involvement in the Middle East. America's
taxpayers certainly would welcome more third-party contributions.