Stymied By Discord

Now that Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime has been toppled, the country’s elected representative have to tackle the ethnic, religious, and social problems he ignored, suppressed, or settled by brute force. As was to be expected, Iraq’s Constitutional Committee was not able to agree on a constitution by last Monday’s deadline. It is just as unlikely to resolve Iraq’s most contentious political issues after the Committee’s seven-day extension.

Roughly 75 percent of the 25 million Iraqis are Arabs and 20 percent Kurds. Islam is their religion, with roughly 60 percent Shiites and 30 percent Sunnis. What used to be Mesopotamia since antiquity became Iraq only after, in 1918, the British conquered the territory, made a mandate out of three former Ottoman provinces, and called the new country Al Iraq (i. e., the origin). That is the main reason why most of the people of Iraq have a much stronger allegiance to their ethnic and religious bases than to the state of Iraq imposed upon them by colonial overlords.

Iraq's minority Sunni Arabs, the country's dominant political force under Saddam Hussein, have been increasingly opposed to conceding autonomy to the Kurds. Since most of Iraq’s oilfields are in the Kurdish and Shiite regions, moreover, the Sunnis demand what they consider an adequate share of the country’s total oil revenues. Sunni interests, however, are underrepresented in the constitutional conference because many of them boycotted the elections for the National Assembly.

Shiites have been countering the Kurdish insistence on more self-government by demanding more autonomy for their own region in the south.The 15 Sunnis on the 55-member Constitutional Committee are rejecting not only the Kurdish and Shiite demands for regional autonomy but also any kind of federalism.

To strengthen his own despotic hold on power, Saddam Hussein--himself a Sunni--had systematically sown distrust and animosity between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The ongoing debate over Iraq’s future has apparently done little to alleviate the three faction’s deeply ingrained grievances against each other.

Impatient Shiites have threatened to ram the constitution they want through the National Assembly against any Sunni veto. If that option succeeded, Iraq would effectively be partitioned and the Sunni minority would further increase its militant resistance against both the non-Sunni population and the foreign occupation.

Even if this dire scenario can be avoided, the future role of the Sharia, the legal system of Islam, also remains undetermined. Under Saddam Hussein, when he allowed polygamy, women still had basic rights. As the American occupation allowed more religious freedom, however, the advocates of the Sharia as the law of the land have been broadcasting their demands for a return to traditional Islamic values loud and clear.

It seems likely that whatever constitution emerges will declare Iraq an Islamic state, and a shura (council) will be instituted to decide the most important legal questions.

What will then happen to the rights of women? Will they again have to observe the hijab (covering head and body)? Will they be able to refuse arranged marriages? Will they have the right to full inheritance? Will their testimony count in court? These are important questions for the women that make up 60 percent of Iraqi society but who are represented in the recently elected National Assembly by only 33 percent of the 275 deputies.

Today Iraq’s leaders enjoy a modest measure of freedom and democracy but the deep-seated conflicts they are facing are far more severe than anything President Bush and his advisers ever imagined. Yet, he predicted in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, 2003 that "The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution,"

Why did nobody warn him of the grim prospect of extensive political, religious, and social obstacles to liberal democracy in post-Hussein Iraq?

Wolf D. Fuhrig	Home	08-21-05
Stymied By Discord
Now that Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime has been toppled, the country’s elected representative have to tackle the ethnic, religious, and social problems he ignored, suppressed, or settled by brute force. As was to be expected, Iraq’s Constitutional Committee was not able to agree on a constitution by last Monday’s deadline. It is just as unlikely to resolve Iraq’s most contentious political issues after the Committee’s seven-day extension. Roughly 75 percent of the 25 million Iraqis are Arabs and 20 percent Kurds. Islam is their religion, with roughly 60 percent Shiites and 30 percent Sunnis. What used to be Mesopotamia since antiquity became Iraq only after, in 1918, the British conquered the territory, made a mandate out of three former Ottoman provinces, and called the new country Al Iraq (i. e., the origin). That is the main reason why most of the people of Iraq have a much stronger allegiance to their ethnic and religious bases than to the state of Iraq imposed upon them by colonial overlords. Iraq's minority Sunni Arabs, the country's dominant political force under Saddam Hussein, have been increasingly opposed to conceding autonomy to the Kurds. Since most of Iraq’s oilfields are in the Kurdish and Shiite regions, moreover, the Sunnis demand what they consider an adequate share of the country’s total oil revenues. Sunni interests, however, are underrepresented in the constitutional conference because many of them boycotted the elections for the National Assembly. Shiites have been countering the Kurdish insistence on more self-government by demanding more autonomy for their own region in the south.The 15 Sunnis on the 55-member Constitutional Committee are rejecting not only the Kurdish and Shiite demands for regional autonomy but also any kind of federalism. To strengthen his own despotic hold on power, Saddam Hussein--himself a Sunni--had systematically sown distrust and animosity between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The ongoing debate over Iraq’s future has apparently done little to alleviate the three faction’s deeply ingrained grievances against each other. Impatient Shiites have threatened to ram the constitution they want through the National Assembly against any Sunni veto. If that option succeeded, Iraq would effectively be partitioned and the Sunni minority would further increase its militant resistance against both the non-Sunni population and the foreign occupation. Even if this dire scenario can be avoided, the future role of the Sharia, the legal system of Islam, also remains undetermined. Under Saddam Hussein, when he allowed polygamy, women still had basic rights. As the American occupation allowed more religious freedom, however, the advocates of the Sharia as the law of the land have been broadcasting their demands for a return to traditional Islamic values loud and clear. It seems likely that whatever constitution emerges will declare Iraq an Islamic state, and a shura (council) will be instituted to decide the most important legal questions. What will then happen to the rights of women? Will they again have to observe the hijab (covering head and body)? Will they be able to refuse arranged marriages? Will they have the right to full inheritance? Will their testimony count in court? These are important questions for the women that make up 60 percent of Iraqi society but who are represented in the recently elected National Assembly by only 33 percent of the 275 deputies. Today Iraq’s leaders enjoy a modest measure of freedom and democracy but the deep-seated conflicts they are facing are far more severe than anything President Bush and his advisers ever imagined. Yet, he predicted in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, 2003 that "The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution," Why did nobody warn him of the grim prospect of extensive political, religious, and social obstacles to liberal democracy in post-Hussein Iraq?

Wolf D. Fuhrig

Home

08-21-05

Stymied By Discord