Wolf D. Fuhrig

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Neocons Losing Influence

Washington, D.C.     Nine days after the al-Qaida attack on New York and Washington, an open letter in the Washington Times called upon President Bush not only to “capture or kill” Osama bin Laden but also to change the regime in Iraq (“even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack”), retaliate against Iran and Syria for supporting Hezbollah, and stop all aid to the Palestinian authority if it continues to resist the Israeli occupation. The letter was signed by some 40 leading neoconservatives representing the think tank “Project for the New American Century” (PNAC), among them Weekly Standard editor William Kristol and Commentary magazine editor Norman Podhoretz.

In April 2002, a similar appeal urged the discontinuation of all contacts with the Palestinian Authority, unlimited support for Israel’s policies, and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Addressed to the President, the message was signed by Richard Perle, then the chairman of the Defense Policy Board (DPB), and several of its members. Inside the Bush administration, the list of influential neoconservative policy planners included Vice President Cheney, his chief aide Scooter Libby, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and the Undersecretaries of Defense Wolfowitz and Feith.

After President Bush declared the mission in Iraq accomplished on May 1, 2003, several members of the DPB urged him “to deal” next withIran and Syria. In the Weekly Standard, Kristol asserted: “We are already in a death struggle with Iran over the future of Iraq.” Soon the administration ended its indirect diplomatic contacts with the Iranians. Later in 2003, Perle and his friend David Frum published their own prescription for U.S. foreign policy: An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.

The neocons’ vision of a “new American Century” called for the United States to use all force necessary to gain total control over the Middle East, and to make Arab and Muslim societies subservient to American and Israeli wishes. The “Evil,” i.e., all resistance to American and Israeli demands and actions, would be crushed with overwhelming military means, much as advocated by Bibi Netanyahu’s radical wing of Israel’s Likud Party.

Bush, Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice adopted most of the neocons’ proposals. Only Secretary of State Colin Powell opposed them as being counterproductive to the eradication of terrorism.

During the summer of 2003, however, it became clear that the neocons’ advice had seriously misled the Bush administration. Contrary to their prediction that winning in Afghanistan and Iraq would be a “cakewalk,” the growing terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere showed how gravely they had underestimated the Muslim determination to resist foreign occupation. The projected de-Ba’athification had been badly mismanaged by Ahmed Chalabi, the neoncons’ shady Iraqi protégé. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the siege of Fallujah further escalated the debacle. Elections in Iran, Egypt, and occupied Palestine showed how strongly America’s neocons and Israel’s Likudniki had caused Islamic radicalism to increase.

Nevertheless, the neocons felt encouraged by the reelection of Bush, the unceremonious departure of Powell, his replacement by the conforming Condi Rice, and the appointment of neocon allies as CIA director (Porter Goss), ambassador to Iraq (Zalmay Khalilzad), and ambassador to the United Nations (John Bolton).

By 2004, however, the President began to give up on two key neocon advisers: Wolfowitz and Feith. Libby was indicted, Goss failed at C.I.A. After the Republican defeat in the mid-term elections, the fumbling Rumsfeld had to go. And Rice annoyed the neocons by promising to work for a Palestinian state.

In Iraq, the dream of Kristol’s “Case for American Empire” in the Middle East had turned into a bloody nightmare. Some neocons still predict “victory,” even though they have no clue how and when it could be achieved.

Dismayed hawks heard Israel’s Prime Minister Olmert offer peace talks to Palestinians and James Baker’s Iraq Study Group consider exit strategies and face-to-face talks with Iran’s and Syria’s leaders. To the battle cry for war on Iran, Baker offered the civilized alternative: “It’s not appeasement to talk to your enemies.”