Washington, D.C. President Bush told author Bob Woodward that he would
not withdraw from Iraq, even if his wife and dog were the only people
left on his
side. The President certainly is not a man who shies away from risks.
He had no qualms attacking Hussein’s Iraq even though Afghanistan
had not been secured against a resurgence of Taliban violence.
In spite of some 65 percent opposition in Congress and throughout the country,
Mr. Bush remains determined to raise the stakes further by sending an additional
21,500 troops against the insurgents in Iraq. He also appointed a new top commander
in Iraq, Lt. General David Patraeus, whose recently published Counterinsurgency
Manual offered Mr. Bush fresh guidance for continuing the battle against guerilla
forces.
Patraeus points out that the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S., particularly
massive firepower, “may be of limited utility or even counterproductive
in counterinsurgency operations.” Moreover, “killing insurgents—while
necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat
an insurgency.” Patraeus concedes, however, that it might be impossible
to kill every insurgent. “Attempting to do so “risks generating popular
resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles
of revenge.”
Ironically, Patraeus does not unconditionally advocate the “surge” of
troops ordered by the President. The general cautions: “The more force
applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial
force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal
military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately
strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established.” The general
concludes that “the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when
more force is needed—and when it might be counterproductive.”
For Patraeus, “lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political
participation, and restored hope”--conditions nowhere at present in sight
in Iraq. “Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots
will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.” In Iraq, however,
the opposite occurred. Neither ballots nor dollars curbed the growing insecurity.
Regrettably, Patraeus is badly mistaken in his assumption that Americans are
fighting only “extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities.” He
does not understand--or simply ignores--the fact that the U.S.’s military
presence all over the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, remains the main cause
of all the criticism, anger, and resistance Americans encounter. After 400 years
of Turkish, British, French, and Italian colonialism, most Muslims--Arab and
non-Arab--yearn to be free from persistent Western interference.
Muslim extremists have demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice their lives
against non-Muslim invaders and their Muslim allies. The vast majority of Muslims,
however, suffer the occupiers in silence or in nonviolent protest. When the Soviets
tried to invade Afghanistan, a nascent Al Qaida organization fought them furiously,
partly with American material support. Only when the Soviets had been repelled,
did Osama bin Laden’s guerillas attack Americans in Saudi Arabia, East
Africa, and the American East Coast.
If we Americans continue to insist on domineering the Middle East and imposing
our political will on its people, terrorist attacks by death-defying Muslims
against us and our allies are unlikely to end. Both we
Americans and the Israelis can only have peace with Arabs and Iranians
if we cease to be occupiers and respect their right to national self-determination.
Bragging and threatening with our technological and military superiority will
not help us make friends that we so badly need in the
Middle East. We have no right to impose our system of government upon people
on the other side of the globe, as long as they do not threaten or hurt us. We
cannot hope to settle the age-old, often violent animosities between Sunnis and
Shi’ites.
Now the President and his foreign policy advisers need more than advice on counterinsurgent
strategies. They need a manual on how they might treat the societies of the Middle
East in the same manner the United States wants to be treated.