Wolf D. Fuhrig

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With seventeen months remaining in his second term, the President appears eager to add at least one notable success to his otherwise ruinous record in the Middle East.  He failed to drive the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of their hideouts, and he disastrously failed to bring peace to Iraq.

There remains a flickering hope that he could beat the odds and coax Israelis and Palestinians into a peace settlement.  Their leaders also badly need to show some progress.  Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is very unpopular having botched the war on Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Palestinian President and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas was kicked out of Gaza by the Hamas government and now presides only over the West Bank.

Yet, due to their precarious political positions, Bush, Olmert, and Abbas have reason to seek whatever compromise solutions Israelis and Palestinians might accept.  That’s why Secretary Rice went on another opinion-gauging tour to the region and proposed an Arab-Israeli peace conference in the U.S. this fall.  She also promised badly needed economic aid to Abbas’ backers.  Olmert made a rare trip to Jericho in the West Bank where he talked with Abbas about “the establishment of a Palestinian State…as soon as possible.”

At present, the big obstacle to any agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is Hamas, the ruling party in Gaza.  It won the democratic elections that both the Bush administration and Israel’s government demanded.  When Fatah did not win, however, Israel and the U.S. refused to talk with Hamas because its leaders refuse to recognize Israel, at least as long as it does not end its 40-year occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Instead of keeping the communication with Hamas open, Israel and the U.S. decided to boycott the Hamas government and, by extension, the 1.3 million inhabitants of Gaza.  As usual, not talking with your opponent, however unappealing, turns out to be the surest way of closing the door to improved relations.

As long as Hamas remains ostracized and continues to reject recognition of Israel under any condition, peace negotiations can focus only on the West Bank and Jerusalem.  Or they can be held only if and when the Hamas government is voted out of office in the next Palestinian elections. Nevertheless, there are enforceable agreements that Olmert and Abbas could reach without Hamas’ participation.

First of all, Israel has to assure the Palestinians where their future borders will be and how these borders will be guarded.  Olmert was said to be willing to offer Abbas 90 percent of the West Bank.  In return, Abbas would drop the demand that Palestinian refugees may return to their former homes inside Israel--a demand no Israeli politician has ever accepted.

Last not least, no peace agreement appears possible unless both sides can agree to share Jerusalem as each country’s capital, and give Jews, Muslims, and Christians open access to their sacred sites.  The strongest opposition to a re-division of Jerusalem is likely to come from orthodox Jews.

Since it is not certain at all that the leaders of Hamas are hell-bent on rejecting the very principle of a permanent peace with the State of Israel, it is urgent for Secretary Rice to ascertain under what conditions Hamas will recognize Israel’s statehood.  This in fact is one of the crucial assignments for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair whom the Diplomatic Quartet (the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) recently appointed as its envoy to Gaza.

When, after the Second World War, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson hosted crucial negotiations between France and Germany, a reporter observed that Acheson functioned not only as coach but also as referee and cheerleader.  That difficult but necessary role ought to be the model for the President and Secretary Rice if they ever succeed in bringing Israelis and Palestinians to the bargaining table for serious peace negotiations.