A Troubling Alliance

Washington, D.C. Pakistan was never as important to the U.S. as after al-Qaeda’s assault on New York City and Washington D.C. on September 9, 2001. Al-Qaeda’s central command appeared to be somewhere on either side of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan--a 1600-mile long, poorly marked line imposed on the Afghans by the British in 1893. 0f the region’s 30 million Pushtuns, half now live on each side of the border; but for them, it hardly exists.

Having suffered British colonial domination since the 1820s, the Pushtuns, like most Muslims, are yearning to be free from Western interference. That’s why many Pushtuns have been aiding the Taliban, the radical Sunnis who have been harboring al-Qaeda terrorists.

To destroy al-Qaeda, it made sense for President Bush to call on Pakistan for assistance. When its President, General Pervez Musharraf, hesitated, Bush warned him on November 6, 2001: "You are either with us or against us." So Musharraf reluctantly pledged to withdraw support for the Taliban and root out terrorist training camps.

Since then, U.S. aid to Pakistan has totaled nearly $11 billion, most of it in military hardware and budget support. Units of Pakistan’s 600,000-man armed forces were deployed to the northwestern border area where they rounded up or killed Taliban fighters sympathetic to al-Qaeda. Musharraf bragged: "We've captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We've earned bounties totaling millions of dollars.”

The Pakistani army’s skirmishes in the tribal northwest territories, however, led to major casualties; and suicide attacks on military outposts increased. These complications led the Musharraf regime to agree to at least temporary suspensions of hostilities with pro-Taliban leaders. Western critics accused Musharraf of surrendering to the terrorists’ supporters, while his domestic detractors denounced his alliance with the West and dubbed him “Busharraf.”

More aggravating yet than Pakistan’s largely inconclusive battle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda proved to be Musharraf’s dictatorial rule at a time when the Bush administration boasted of bringing ”freedom and democracy” to the region. In 1999, Musharraf overthrew the government of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Muslim League, in a bloodless coup. Two years later, the general declared himself president of Pakistan, even though he had promised to lead only a transitional government to rid the ruling elite of corruption and prepare the country for a renewed multiparty democracy within four years.

In 2002, Musharraf unilaterally added 29 amendments to Pakistan’s constitution that granted him the power to dissolve parliament and remove the prime minister. He defends his autocratic conduct by claiming that he practices "enlightened moderation."

Although by now Musharraf has remained in power for more than seven years, he insisted on getting himself re-elected. His eligibility, however, as both president and army chief of staff remained to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court.

By November 3, fearing an adverse court decision, Musharraf issued what he called “Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1.” It suspends Pakistan’s constitution and with it the rule of law, as well as freedom of speech, assembly, and association.

In view of this renewed denial of “freedom and democracy” to the people of Pakistan, President Bush was faced with a crucial dilemma: to keep or to drop his most important non-NATO ally. He told Musharraf to resign as army’s chief and call for early elections, but he also assured him of his continued support.

Mr. Bush made no mention of Musharraf’s disgraceful firing of Pakistan’s Supreme Court justices who were about to declare his ongoing rule a gross violation of the constitution. Neither did the White House or Congress demand the reinstatement of Pakistan’s political parties and allow the exiled leader of the Muslim League to return.

Musharraf’s undemocratic conduct raises a crucial question: Do we prefer a dictator who appears to be useful to America’s anti-terrorist operations to a democratic government that may not support our foreign policy objetives? Just like Stalin during World War II, Musharraf may be a thug, but at least he is our thug.

Wolf D. Fuhrig	Home	11-18-07
A Troubling Alliance
*Washington, D.C.* Pakistan was never as important to the U.S. as after al-Qaeda’s assault on New York City and Washington D.C. on September 9, 2001. Al-Qaeda’s central command appeared to be somewhere on either side of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan--a 1600-mile long, poorly marked line imposed on the Afghans by the British in 1893. 0f the region’s 30 million Pushtuns, half now live on each side of the border; but for them, it hardly exists. Having suffered British colonial domination since the 1820s, the Pushtuns, like most Muslims, are yearning to be free from Western interference. That’s why many Pushtuns have been aiding the Taliban, the radical Sunnis who have been harboring al-Qaeda terrorists. To destroy al-Qaeda, it made sense for President Bush to call on Pakistan for assistance. When its President, General Pervez Musharraf, hesitated, Bush warned him on November 6, 2001: "You are either with us or against us." So Musharraf reluctantly pledged to withdraw support for the Taliban and root out terrorist training camps. Since then, U.S. aid to Pakistan has totaled nearly $11 billion, most of it in military hardware and budget support. Units of Pakistan’s 600,000-man armed forces were deployed to the northwestern border area where they rounded up or killed Taliban fighters sympathetic to al-Qaeda. Musharraf bragged: "We've captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We've earned bounties totaling millions of dollars.” The Pakistani army’s skirmishes in the tribal northwest territories, however, led to major casualties; and suicide attacks on military outposts increased. These complications led the Musharraf regime to agree to at least temporary suspensions of hostilities with pro-Taliban leaders. Western critics accused Musharraf of surrendering to the terrorists’ supporters, while his domestic detractors denounced his alliance with the West and dubbed him “Busharraf.” More aggravating yet than Pakistan’s largely inconclusive battle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda proved to be Musharraf’s dictatorial rule at a time when the Bush administration boasted of bringing ”freedom and democracy” to the region. In 1999, Musharraf overthrew the government of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Muslim League, in a bloodless coup. Two years later, the general declared himself president of Pakistan, even though he had promised to lead only a transitional government to rid the ruling elite of corruption and prepare the country for a renewed multiparty democracy within four years. In 2002, Musharraf unilaterally added 29 amendments to Pakistan’s constitution that granted him the power to dissolve parliament and remove the prime minister. He defends his autocratic conduct by claiming that he practices "enlightened moderation." Although by now Musharraf has remained in power for more than seven years, he insisted on getting himself re-elected. His eligibility, however, as both president and army chief of staff remained to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. By November 3, fearing an adverse court decision, Musharraf issued what he called “Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1.” It suspends Pakistan’s constitution and with it the rule of law, as well as freedom of speech, assembly, and association. In view of this renewed denial of “freedom and democracy” to the people of Pakistan, President Bush was faced with a crucial dilemma: to keep or to drop his most important non-NATO ally. He told Musharraf to resign as army’s chief and call for early elections, but he also assured him of his continued support. Mr. Bush made no mention of Musharraf’s disgraceful firing of Pakistan’s Supreme Court justices who were about to declare his ongoing rule a gross violation of the constitution. Neither did the White House or Congress demand the reinstatement of Pakistan’s political parties and allow the exiled leader of the Muslim League to return. Musharraf’s undemocratic conduct raises a crucial question: Do we prefer a dictator who appears to be useful to America’s anti-terrorist operations to a democratic government that may not support our foreign policy objetives? Just like Stalin during World War II, Musharraf may be a thug, but at least he is our thug.

Wolf D. Fuhrig

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11-18-07

A Troubling Alliance